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Socialist Organiser1988 1988-09-15Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 9 →
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Ings. The contrast between the two Koreas reflects the general picture.
And this is not an extraordinary ituation of acute short-term crisis - as the position in the USSR 1 the '30s could perhaps be viewed t the time. It is a stable pattern ver 40, 50 or 60 years.
The command economies have ult up large and powertul working lasses, working classes which have hown tremendous socialist potenal. In that sense they have created reconditions for socialism. But in leir repression of the working class hey are further away from ocialism than many market conomies. 2. The development of the prouctive forces may be progressive ven if the immediate results for the forkers are bad. Many post-1951 no reason to doubt that.
But the sort of nationalised economy that exists in the Eastern Bloc has no superiority over a market economy - neither superiority in the conditions it creates for the workers, nor superiority in long-term development of the productive forces. The bureaucracies 3. Outside the USSR, the ruling bureaucracies are not usurpers of the nationalised economies: they created them. They did not create them because mass pressure forced them to do so against their will. They created them according to their own wishes and their own designs.
The bureaucracies are not acutely unstable. For 40 to 50 years they Gass lat. The USSR does not corres pond exactly to Lenin's picture of imperialism in his 1916 pamphlet. But then neither does any other country today. Today we commonly use the word "imperialism" in a wider sense than did Lenin, for whom "imperialism" started only around 1898-1902. In that broader sense of the word "imperialism" the US, Britain, etc are imperialist - and so is the USSR.
Nearly 50 years ago Trotsky wrote: "The driving force behind the Moscow bureaucracy is indubitably the tendency to expand its power, its prestige, its revenues. This is the element of imperialism' in the widest sense of the word which was a property in the past of all monarchies, oligarchies, ruling Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europe looks at the different levels of oppression which exist in the Stalinist states — oppression of the working class, of many nationalities, of political dissidents. It argues that the labour movement in Britain must give wholehearted support to the struggle against that oppression.
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Socialist Organiser no.371 15 September 1988 Page 10 From page 9 "bureaucratic collectivist" society which some of his opponents in 1940 described. Only where Trotsky's 1940 opponents put a minus sign on these new societies and called them barbarism, the neoTrotskyists put a plus sign and called them the socialist revolution. That was the essential and only meaning of the "degenerated and deformed workers' states" tag.
Isaac Deutscher made this clear. His writings on Stalin and the Stalinist states greatly influenced the post-1951 Trotskyists. Yet, in a reflective summing-up published just after he died in 1967, he avowed that maybe the bureaucracies were new ruling classes. In substance — there can be no doubt about it his picture of the Stalinist states was that of new societies which were progressive, but had no working-class' imprint on them at all.
This has been the fundamental tendency of all the post-1951 "workers' state" theories. It has been accompanied by another tendency, which Militant perhaps brings out most clearly: to write Stalinism into the socialist programme as a progressive (if limited) and perhaps necessary (if regrettable) stage between capitalism and socialism for underdeveloped countries.
The general pattern of post-1951 Trotskyism's response to : Stalinist revolutions has been this: for al period to pretend that the revolutionaries are somehow "working-class" or at least part of the "world revolutionary process"; then finally to recognise that the regimes repress the working class, but to continue to see them as somehow progressive.
History took an ironic revenge on the ghost of Leon Trotsky. His most literal and "orthodox" followers embraced the politics of some of his most despised opponents on the left in the 1930s, the so-called "Brandlerites". These were the "Right Communists", the co-thinkers of Bukharin, expelled from the Communist International after 1929. They were much more numerous than the Trotskyists in the 1930s. They criticised the Comintern and the USSR for specific policies and for lack of democracy, but refused define the bureaucracy as a distinct social formation and rejected Trotsky's call for a new - 'political' — revolution.
The mutation of neo-Trotskyism 1948. Tito fell out with Stalin. The into neo-Brandlerism neo-Trotskyists started to pretend that Tito's regime and Tito's bureaucracy were somehow part of the 'world revolution'. Since then the official Trotskyist movement has combined, in an unstable melange, Trotsky's revolutionary programme for the USSR with a critical-Stalinist reformist programme for a succession of other Stalinist states - Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, Vietnam.
Our politics Our political attitude to the workers and bureaucracies in the Eastern Bloc has been quite different from that of other Trotskyists following the 1951 formula of the "degenerated and deformed workers' states" • We should have been more explicit and outspoken about Vietnamese Stalinism - we did attack the illusions widespread on the left, but only, so to speak, in footnotes - but beyond that we have nothing to reproach ourselves with in practical politics. We did not - as did the Healyites - prattle about the danger of capitalist restoration in Czechoslovakia in 1968. We supported Solidarnosc's call for a working-class boycott of Polish goods when martial law was imposed in 1981. We demanded the withdrawal of USSR troops from Afghanistan from day one.
Over the last 30-odd years, many Trotskyists have made many efforts - often very intricate - to formulate better theories to underpin the 1951 codification. But aren't all those efforts scholastic? Isn't the shift of focus from the working class to the nebulous, classless *world revolution' a logical product of the attempt to define Yugoslavia, China, etc. as somehow distorted socialist revolutions? (For sure the working class was not centre stage to make those revolutions socialist. So what was? The 'world revolution'.) Isn't the great instability of official Trotskyism, its constant wavering in its attitude to the Eastern Bloc states, an inescapable consequence of the unviability of the 1951 formulas?
Increasingly, the formula "degenerated and deformed workers' states" plays no role at all in our substantive political arguments. Our conclusions are derived from factual assessment, and the formula sits uncomfortably on top of that factual assessment as a formula, no more. Isn't it time to reassess?
The provisional nature of Trotsky's formula Trotsky, and the Trotskyists up to 1948, made it clear that they saw the description of the USSR as a "degenerated workers' state" as provisional - a makeshift term for an unstable contradictory structure. In The Revolution Betrayed (1935), Trotsky's summary definition of the USSR appears under the heading, "The Character of the Soviet Union Not Yet Decided by History". In 1939 he commented on his definition of the ruling bureaucracy as a caste.
"Its relative superiority lies in this, that the makeshift character of the term is clear to everybody, since it would enter nobody's mind to identify the Moscow oligarchy with the Hindu caste of Brahmins. The old sociological terminology did not and could not prepare a name for a new social event which is in the process of evolution (degeneration) and which has not assumed stable forms", And again: "Symptomatic of his oncoming death agony, by the sweep and monstrous fraudulence of his purge, Stalin testifies to nothing else but the incapacity of the bureaucracy to transform itself into a stable ruling class. Might we not place ourselves in a ludicrous position if we affixed to the Bonapartist oligarchy the nomenclature of a new ruling class just a few years or even a few months prior to its inglorious downfall?"
And in 1948 the Trotskyists wrote:
*Under these conditions, the progressive character of the productive relations means nothing else but that a change in property relations is not necessary for the overthrow of the bureaucracy. The production relations and bureaucratic management are more and more inextricably bound up. Consequently, the progressive character of the Russian economy, which is determined by its capacity to develop the productive forces, tends to become eliminated by the bureaucracy. The greatest attention must be devoted to the study of this development...
If we apply the term 'degenerated workers' state' to this social organism, we are perfectly aware of the necessity to constantly bring up to date the complete and precise meaning of this definition. In reality, it is impossible to give any exact definition of present Russian society without a lengthy description. The relative superiority of this formula in comparison with all the others proposed up till now lies in this, that it takes into account the historic origin of the USSR and at the same time emphasises its noncapitalist character and the instability of its social relations, which have not yet acquired their final historic physiognomy... Time to reassess *The greatest attention must be devoted to the study of this development..." But the attention has not been devoted. After 40 years - and after many years of increasingly clear political divergence between us and the post-1951 Trotskyist mainstream — it is time to reconsider.
The only political, programmatic consequence of dropping the "degenerated and deformed Demonstration in support of Dubcek, Cz workers' state" codification would cap be to drop the formula of "defence regr of the USSR" in war, or, as the (he Trotskyists of 1948 more précisely 197. put it, "defence of what remains of the the conquests of October" . But we Cut said long ago that that formula was Viet a "tenth-rate issue" politically. In C the era of nuclear weapons, it is dif- Shal ficult to see what such "defence of that the USSR" could mean practically. Shai How can you "defend nationalised property" in a nuclear armaged- the : don? Fou It is time to reassess. It is time to The examine the idea that the Eastern Stali Bloc states are exploiting economies weet essentially parallel, as regards the colle development of the forces of pro- - al duction, to market capitalism. lecti It is a good time to reassess, too. and Often in the past discussion among seric Trotskyists on the Eastern Bloc has that been stifled by loud noise about abo "capitulation to imperialism" and Shar "Shachtmanism" . Today, when US shar imperialism and the Kremlin are on was better terms than for many years than and the bourgeois press is feting Thei Gorbachev, such clamour is more fron difficult, No doubt some will try to clamour. But we have learned enough in recent years not to be fazed when we are accused of "capitulation to imperialism" by those who think that supporting Argentina's mini-colonialism or the USSR's imperialism are the height of "anti-imperialism"
And what of "Shachtmanism"? Max Shachtman was a leader of the American Trotskyist movement who split with Trotsky in 1940 over reactions to the Hitler-Stalin pact and shortly afterwards developed a theory of the USSR as a new "bureaucratic collectivist" society.
Shachtman never fully sorted out his ideas on the place of "bureaucratic collectivism" in historical perspective. Initially he saw it as progressive compared to techoslovakia 1968 italism; later, as utterly essive and barbaric. In old age died, politically isolated, in 2) he is said to have supported US's Bay of Pigs invasion of ya and its bombing of North nam.
learly we do not want to follow chtman in those respects. But is not all there was to chtman.
s late as 1948, he was present at Second World Congress of the rth International. The Congress ses on "The USSR and inism' made a distinction betn 'revolutionary' bureaucratic ectivists - meaning Shachtman nd reactionary bureaucratic colvists like Dwight Macdonald James Burnham. There was ›us talk of a reunification. In period - there is no doubt ut it with hindsight -chtman was far clearer and per in his assessment of what happening in the Eastern Bloc 1 were the official Trotskyists.
re are positive things to learn n Shachtman.
How to discuss We must conduct the discussion carefully. Too often discussion of the command economies on the left has been just a search for a label that can then be wielded as a sect badge. But a label is no substitute for detailed, careful, factual We have seen that the substantive theories under the "degenerated and deformed workers' state" name-tag are various forms of "progressive bureaucratic collectivism" . Under other name-tags, too, operate a variety of quite different and often incongruent theories.
Take the British SWP as an example. It calls the USSR state capitalist. That is its sect badge.
But read its basic text, Cliff's book of 1947. It says that capitalism is collapsing; the USSR is forging ahead industrially; the USSR's economy is regulated by international arms competition rather than the law of value; not even labour-power is a commodity there; it has no trend to overproduction; and so on. In fact it portrays the USSR as a "progressive bureaucratic collectivism" — a new form of exploiting society productively superior to capitalism. Cliff then evades the logical conclusions of this analysis by sheer moralism.
And what about the other Eastern Bloc states? They are called state capitalist, but no attempt is made to extend to them the thesis that arms competition regulates their economies land makes them capitalist, In fact the SWP's *state capitalist" label is only a label. Underneath that label it chops and changes between a variety of substantive theories and political conclusions, with no clear accoun ting.
We are concerned, of course, to find the best label. Some of us think that some term like "bureaucratic collectivism" is the best approximation. Others would prefer state capitalism". This must be discussed. But we have no intention, no intention at all, of finding a label according to a preset timetable.
Our concern is first and foremost to develop an exact, concrete assessment of the workers' struggles and the bureaucracy's operations in the Eastern Bloc, and to fight for a programme for workers' liberty East and West.
For too long the Trotskyist movement has been dominated by sect labels and shibboleths on the question of the USSR. We intend to break that domination. We hope other working-class socialists will join us in our discussion.