Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

A self-limiting revolution?

Socialist Organiser nos. 369–370: Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europe?, 1 September 1988 · scan pp. 29–31 · about 2,276 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 29 →

Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 29

From August 1980 until the declaration of martial law in December 1981 there were two powers in Poland: the workers' movement and the Stalinist bureaucracy.

The two powers faced each other in a situation of unstable equilibrium. Most of the basic preconditions for a revolution were present. The regime was no longer able to continue ruling in the old way, and the masses were no longer prepared to be ruled in the old way.

At different times, the initiative switched from one side to the other.

But, in the end, what proved decisive was the fact that Solidarnose never fully faced up to the possibilities and the opportunities that presented themselves.

As a result,. bureaucracy was able to line up behind General Jaruselski. The military was the part of the State apparatus which maintained the most cohesion; taking advantage of Solidarnosc's failure to provide a clear political answer to the massive social crisis which developed from the summer of 1981 — the strike wave and hunger marches — Jaruzelski stepped forward as the 'saviour' of the nation.

Jacek Kuron, the leading theorist of the 'self limiting revolution' which ultimately prevented Solidarnosc facing up to this danger, could nonetheless see this threat quite clearly: In August 1981 he argued: "Part of society could turn to the idea of a strong government as a ray of hope. We can already see the idea grow around the figurehead of Jaruzelski..."

The basic idea behind 'self limiting revolution' was simple. Poland is part of the Russian Empire, so any attempt to break from this "geo-political reality" through the overthrow of the buraucrats can only lead to disaster. That was the lesson of Hungary '56 and Czechoslovakia '68. Russian tanks would put an end to any radical movement which went too far, too soon.

The reason this theory could exercise such a grip on Solidarnose was that it addressed squarely the central problem of revolution in Eastern Europe. Tragically, it provided the wrong answer.

Though this theory was most clearly put forward by Kuron, one of the heroic pipneers of the Polish labour movement, it ultimately represented the viewpoint of the middle strata of Stalinist society - the technicians and the intelligentsia.

Drawing on a variety of sources, including Eurocommunism, the 'self limiting revolution' implied the need for an 'Historic Compromise' between the workers and the regime. But the social basis for such a compromise did not exist.

The Polish of :206 Russian tanks: the limit to revblution? deep, and the prospects for a "socialdemocratic' reformist solution on Western lines were virtually nonexistent.

Unlike the capitalist rulers in the West, the Stalinist bureaucracy has never been willing to co-exist indefinitely with a genuine workers' movement. Politics and economics are too closely fused. The bureaucracy's stability depends upon the atomisation of the working class.

Poland is a relatively open society by Eastern European standards. But 'civil society' - the institutions outside the state itself that help to hold society together — are still very weak. And this basic feature makes bureaucratic power relatively fragile and exposed. That is why repression and force are so important in holding these systems together.

The bureaucrats cannot share power and they cannot even make the kinds of concessions to the workers that the capitalists can in the advanced capitalist countries of the West.

bigniew Kowalewski, a leader of th eft wing of Solidarnosc, pointed t another set of problems associated with self limiting revolution'. Discussing th deas of the 'Network' - marke rientated supporters of workers' self management — he argued:

'The strategy of 'self limiting revolution' conditioned the Network's project. Consciously or not, it conformed to a political vision according to which it was certainly possible to overthrow bureaucratic power at the grass roots -the municipalities — but not at central level"

bureaucracy's monopoly economic power rests on two linked factors: on one side, the total suppression, Reform or by political means, of democratic institutions of self-organisation and representation of the workers and the citizens, and the lack of any control by such institutions over the central authority; and, on the other side, the large-scale administrative suppression or the other factor of control, market mechanisms. The law of value cannot be suppressed in a post-capitalist economy. It has to wither away, in parallel with other market categories, including the buying and selling of labour-power. The re-establishment, to a certain extent, of the operation of the law of value as an element of control over the plan, is one of the indispensable objectives of reform of economic management in'the revolution against the bureaucratic regime. But if you consider that, for political reasons, the development of democratic institutions of the working class cannot go beyond a certain threshold the 'geopolitical factor' [the threat of USSR intervention] determining the relation of forces in the last analysis), then you automatically seek to limit the power of the bureaucracy by the maximum development of the market. If workers' councils cannot exercise real control over the bureaucratic regime, then let the market do it instead: such was the Network's logic. The question was posed in the following manner: if we can only take power in the workplaces, the workers' councils must be able to base themselves on a maximum of enterprise autonomy in relation to the organs of power held by the central bureaucracy, Many self-management activists disagreed with this position and argued that there could be no workers' power in the workplaces without resolving the question of power at the level of the Revolution Eastern Europe Page 27

Scan page 30

One of the consequences of this position was that the Solidarnosc leadership lacked any clear answers to the deep social and economic crisis that gripped Polish society. If the workers could only take bits of power, whether they liked it or not they still had to take a lot of the responsibility for the failure of the system as a whole. This explains the hostility of part of the Solidarnosc leadership to many of the wildcat economic strikes of the late summer and autumn of 1981.

But once Solidarnosc failed to give a clear focus to workers' protests, many moved towards the right. As Karol Modzelewski argued: 'The union is not as strong as it was. It is weaker and every activist knows it" • With the declaration of martial law Solidarnosc paid for this weakness.

If the 'self limiting revolution' was an illusion what was the alternative?

Kuron was right to look at the "Geopolitical reality" of Poland's status as a subject nation in the Russian Empire. But instead of seeing this relationship as setting the limits to radical change it should be seen as the decisive obstacle to be overcome for the workers' revolution to take place.

When Kuron co-wrote, with Karol Modzelewski, the historic "Open letter to the Party" in 1964, he understood this point quite clearly:

"WE ARE TOLD: 'We live in the centre of European conflicts. The world is divided into camps, and both sides have atomic weapons. All revolutionary movements in this situation are crimes against the nation and against humanity. The Polish "raison d'etat", following from the international situation and our geographical situation, demands our silence and obedience. Otherwise, we are menaced with atomic annihilation or, at best, with intervention by the tanks of a friendly power, as happened in Hungary. Under such conditions, to analyse social structures, to discuss surplus value, to work out political programmes — these are occupations which are either irrational or simply harmful. In order to build socialism one must first of all exist'.

1) This thinking is based on the assumption that revolution is the result of a criminal conspiracy against internal or world peace. It is the traditional argument of all anti-revolutionary ideologies and well known in the history of the workers' movement. It is typical police -hinking. In reality, revolutions are the ›fesult of economic and social crisis. From the social point of view, revoluPtion is always an act of force which pits the strength of a social movement against that of the ruling power. But revolution is the act of an enormous majority of society directed against the rule of a minority that is in political crisis and whose apparatus of coercion has been weakened. That is why revolution does not necessarily have to be carried out by force of arms. The possibility of avoiding civil war depends on such factors as the level of consciousness and organisation of the revolutionary movement which limit the degree of chaos and the possibilities of armed counteraction.

in The real crime against the internal peace of the country is committed by the ruling bureaucracy, which first tries to disorganise the masses, deprive them of political consciousness and then uses armed force to try to break their revolutionary movement. We remember Poznan and Budapest.

2) The argument of Soviet tanks. It is said that an eventual revolution in Poland would inevitably lead to Soviet armed intervention, the result of which, from the military point of view, is not open to doubt. Those who advance this way of exception, is torn by class struggles while in neighbouring countries there are no classes but only regular armies with a given number of planes and tanks. For them, the revolution neither crosses national boundaries nor has an effect beyond them.

This typical 'political realism' completely contradicts historical experience. Revolutionary crises have always been Jacek Kuron on an international nature. 1956 was no exception, but the bureaucracy then had at its disposal economic and social reserves which enabled it to handle the crisis by a reform manoeuvre. This made it possible to put a brake on the development of the revolution in Poland, to prevent a revolutionary situation from arising in Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the USSR and, thereby, permitted the Hungarian revolution to be isolated and crushed. The present phase of the crisis is marked by a lack of the necessary reserves for such a manoeuvre. This is true not only in Poland but also in Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Hungary and even of the USSR itself. It is difficult to foresee in which of these countries the revolution will begin; it is certain, however, that it will not end where it begins. The crisis in these countries cannot be mitigated, even temporarily, by reforms and concessions because there is nothing more to concede or to reform within the framework of the system. Under these conditions, the revolutionary movement must spread to the whole camp, while the possibilities of armed intervention on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy (if it is still in power) will not be measured by the number of its tanks and planes but by the degree of tension of class conflicts within the If Kuron and the other KOR activists had held to this analysis, and organised on the basis of it, Polish history might have been different.

The KOR activists did the vital preparatory work for the construction of a mass workers' movement. But in the end Kuron and the KOR failed the Polish workers ideologically.

Part of this failure was the Solidarnosc leadership's attitude to Polish nationalism. Though many on the left criticise Solidarnosc for being too nationalist, in an important sense they were not nationalist enough.

The Solidarnose leadership should have prepared from the very beginning for the inevitable conflict that was to come. They should have clearly stated their commitment to fight for Polish independence. This could have given clear focus to the deep-seated national aspirations of the Polish people. The Solidarnosc leadership vacated the field of nationalist sentiment to the anti-semitic, anti-gypsy and crudely anti-Russian Right. Their timidity on this question also let the Polish bureaucracy off the hook: the dictators of the future were able to hold the threat of Russian invasion like a pistol to Solidarnosc's head, as if they had a common worry. A militantly 'nationalist' stand by Solidarnosc would more clearly have exposed the bureaucracy's real interests. While Solidarnosc was working for a 'national accord', the bureaucracy was preparing to strike.

The Polish workers could have beaten back and defeated a Russian invasion. If rank and file soldiers had been drawn into Solidarnosc; if the movement could offer a clear vision of an alternative society; and if it could convince the majority that it had a chance of winning, victory might have been possible.

The Russian Stalinists could not guarantee that they could defeat Solidarnosc. Poland has a much bigger population than Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and the Polish workers have immense social power. There is no certainty that Russian tanks could quell an armed Polish people, and unlike 1956 or 1968 the Russian Stalinists were bogged down in a costly, protracted war in Afghanistan. A beacon of workers' democracy in Poland could have inspired revolts by the workers and oppressed nationalities of the other countries of Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union itself.

This is speculation. But the tragedy of Poland is that Solidarnosc went down to defeat in circumstances that were far from the best. In December 1981, the heroic militants of Solidarnosc fought for their lives in the factories and mines against the army and the riot police. But they fought from a position of weakness, after they had lost the initiative. Lech Walesa was right when he declared in December 1981: 'Confrontation is inevitable and confrontation will take place. Let us abandon all illusions. They (the regime) have been thumbing their noses at us"

It is a tragedy that Solidarnosc grasp this truth much earlier.

Scan page 31

Hungary '56

----- pull-quotes -----

view assume that everything takes place in 'one country in isolation' which, by

← Contents of Socialist Organiser nos. 369–370: Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europe?

Something wrong on this page? Tell us →