Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

Yugoslavia: national

Socialist Organiser nos. 369–370: Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europe?, 1 September 1988 · scan pp. 11–12 · Zbigniew Kowalewski · about 2,007 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 11 →

Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 11

the basis for the post war settlement between the dominant world powers - the USA and the USSR. It was strictly adhered to: Stalin's 'patch' did not include Greece, and so he helped strangle a revolution there.

One country, Yugoslavia, also originally part of the Russian bloc, broke free of it. The nationalist movemment under the leadership of Tito was much more independent than the various regimes imposed on other East European countries, and was not prepared to accept complete subordination to Moscow. Albania also charted a separate course.

Elsewhere, although these countries were never incorporated into the USSR proper, they were very heavily under its control. Power was held by 'Communist' parties who depended not upon popular support but upon Russian backing. If their allies were under threat from popular revolt, the Russians had tanks ready to move in.

The revolution in Hungary in 1956 was in large part, nationalist in inspiration. One of the main demands of the Hungarian people was for independence from the USSR, which meant, in particular, the withdrawal of Hungary from the Russian-dominated, Warsaw Pact.

The response in Mosçow — supposedly experiencing a 'thaw' of the Gorbachev type in the wake of Krushchev's "revelations' about the Stalin period, made earlier in the year — was to send in the tanks. No greater proof of Hungary's lack : Of national independence could have been possible.

Peter Fryer, a journalist for the British Communist Parly, sent to cover events in Hungary and eventually expell. Yugoslavia has been a pioneer of 'mark socialism' since the 1950s. Today it has rocketing inflation, 30% unemployment in some areas and a huge foreign debt.

Attempts by Yugoslavia's rulers to solve the country's economic problems are bringing national divisions again to the fore.

Yugoslavia is made up of six Republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia. Hergezovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and two autonomous provinces. It has 22 different nationalities. Above the republics which have considerable powers of regional government is a Federal Government.

Until Tito's death in 1980, the Federal Government was able to mediate and conciliate regional differences fairly effec. tively. The relative economic prosperity enjoyed by Yugoslavia for much of this period was a key factor in this. But by the late 1970s divisions began to emerge again as wage levels started falling and prices rose.

The richest republic Slovenia, has wagi levels six times those of Kosovo, the poorest. Kosovo also has a large ethnic Albanian population.

In Spring of 1981 protests in Kosovo against the high cost of living rapidly grew over into nationalist rioting, with the Albanian population demanding that Kosovo be given the status of a seventh republic. At present it is one of the two 'autonomous provinces'.

The govenment dealt with the uprising by sealing off the capital and declaring a state of emergency. But discontent still bubbles.

The Federal government sees one of the ways out of the economic impasse creating a more integrated national market and doing away with internal trade barriers. The Republic's have the power to levy their own taxes - and many tax goods mainly imported from other provinces at higer levels than 'home' produced goods. Regional differences in wealth mean that workers in poorer republics lose out — price levels often are dictated by those in Slovenia, which means that poorly paid workers in places like Kosovo and Macedonia are badly hit.

But regional governments are opposed to more integration. The smaller republics' bureaucrats do not want to be dictated to by the larger republics.

An opinion poll conducted in 1985 in a Belgrade newspaper showed that 62% of Yugoslavians thought relations between the nationalities were "satisfactory' -down from 83% in 1964.

The bureaucrats are worried about the resurgence of nationalist discontent. There are 400,000 political trials a year ir Yugoslavia, mainly arising from nationalist agitation in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia. 70% of those are for 'verbal crimes.' As Yugoslavia's rulers attempt to strengthen the central government, national divisions are likely to become more and more acute. Hostility between the two biggest ethnic groups, the Serbs and the Croats is heightening. Only a working class political programme coupl ed with real democracy for national minorities can avoid these differences ploding into communal conflict.

in Eastern Europe

Scan page 12

Contradictions of Gorbachev's policies ed for telling the truth them, commented at the time:

"Even if White Terror had been raging, it must be said, said openly and with emphasis, that from the standpoint of socialist principle the Soviet Union would still not have been justified in intervening...It was a clear and flagrant breach of...(the principle) that no nation can be free if if oppresses other nations". ('Hungarian Tragedy', p.68)

But the Hungarian revolution also had positive lessons. The social force that led the revolution was the working class: strikes and the formation of Gorbachev's policy on nationalities difficult to assess.

There are two extreme situations. First, the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the Brezhner period., strons cliques formed in these two republics, two corrupt cliques which made many concessions to intellec. tuals: important developments in cultural life, in the study of history. It had a strong nationalist character, sometimes reactionary. The elimination of these cliques by Gorbachev suggests an offensive against these nationalities. Their slogan is to revive 'Soviet patriotism'. This caused revolt in Kazakhstan, a mass action linked to nationality — a strong anti-Russian expression.

The nationalities policy of Brezhnev's period was characterised by Great Russian chauvinism e.g. Kirgizia. The Gorbachev reforms have been followed by liberalisation. An establishment writer has written against Russification of language especially the question of the alphabet (The Arabic alphabet was better than the Cyrillic).

Also there has been more open discussion on ethnic origin of Kirgiz people. Two concessions have been made. In the Ukraine also there are new possibilities to discuss national issues more freely.

So there's a contradiction: Liberalisation for some nationalities, an offensive in others.

Where is the economic reform going? Marxists don't know much about the economic functioning in the USSR. There are lots of problems in sorting out how the bureaucracy functions and how it runs the country. Generally we assume there is bureaucratic centralism. Obviously there is, but how it works is hard to say. The problem of analysis goes back to the question of the purges in the 1930s. The traditional Trotskyist analysis of the purges is not adequate. I follow the ideas of a French historian of Hungarian origin who's studied it carefully. He thinks one of the functions of the Great Terror was an attempt by the bureaucracy to centralise the bureaucracy. This was represented by the Stalin faction. But Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europe Page lo workers' councils characterised the movement. And elsewhere it has also been the working class, and working class forms of activity, that have dominated popular movements in There had been an earlier revolt in East Germany in 1953. One of the sparks for the Hungarian events of 1956 was protest taking place in Poland. Czechoslovakia saw a brief 'Prague Spring' in 1968 before Russian tanks were sent in. And of course Poland saw further 'unrest' , culminating in the huge strike wave that gave birth to Solidarhe argues that the attempt failed. The Stalin faction was trying to contront centrifugal tendencies in the bureaucratic running of the economy and within the bureaucracy itself. So it poses the question of the existence, in the '30s, of strong pressure groups linked to branches of industry, regions etc. And he describes how they resisted centralisation.

The bureaucratic centre was forced to make compromises. They accepted the existence of centrifugal tendencies and held them in check by repression etc. Obviously that's not all there was to the Great Terror, but an important aspect.

The problem today: terror demobilised, so how does the bureaucracy control these centrifugal tendencies within itself?

The traditional Stalinist system worked up to a point in controlling them. So after the Stalin period, the question was how to do the same thing by different means?

My only way of looking at it is through parallel with Poland. So all these attempts at market reforms are responses to this problem of centrifugal forces in the running of the economy, all based on a false consciousness amongst groups like Gorbacher's They think the old bureaucratic centralism doesn't work and they're right. They think the solution is the introduction of market mechanisms -but they're wrong. The introduction of market mechanisms can only lead to a reinforcement of the centrifugal tendencies. All it would mean is a freer rivalry between different economic groups for a share of central investment funds. The most powertul roups will have greater acces • what vou get is a sharpening ‹ tendencies to overaccumulation.

More overdevelopment of heavy industry, worse starving of consumer industry and worsening of the imbalance between them. We may see periods of great economic growth, but it will have the effect of deepening the economic crisis.

So if the reforms work in terms of to cen- breaking resistance of groups they will they will This was produce a greater crisis in 10 years 10 years nose in 1980.

The Polish workers tried to learn from the experience of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Solidarnose adopted a strategy that became known as the 'self limiting revolution' . By holding back on their demands they felt they could prevent a Russian intervention.

In the end the 'self limiting revolution' limited itself to defeat. There was a coup led by General Jaruselski, rather than an invasion. But there was and is no doubt that behind Jaruselski stood Brezhnev, and later his successors.

So the independence of Poland, the sentiment for which was as strong as it had been in Hungary, needed to be raised as a demand of the struggle. The demand in itself would not, of course, have prevented Russian intervention or the Polish army's coup. But the movement needed to understand clearly that this was a central objective. And it needed to try to inspire the peoples of other Eastern European countries to follow its example.

National oppression and the struggle against it continue to be powerful elements in the powder keg of the Eastern bloc. Within the USSR itself, recent disturbances in Armenia elsewhere only represent the tip of the iceberg. In the Ukraine, a nation of 60 million people, the largest oppressed nation in the world, there has for a long time been a nationalist movement, which Gorbachev may now find increasingly impossible to repress.

Other East European countries also have their own internal national divisions and problems. Yugoslavia, made up of many different nationalities, has recently seen growing social and political strife, and at the heart of this has been national discontent; there has been conflict between Serbs and Albanians.

In Transylvania, Rumania, the large Hungarian minority faces severe persecution. Many have fled over the border into Hungary, and their families who have stayed behind have facea turther oppression.

Socialists should support the right of nations to self-determination. The countries of Eastern Europe have the right to be free of Russian influence, withdraw from the Warsaw Pact whatever else they choose. The various nations that form the USSR also have the right to independence if they want it. We should not worry that the nationalist movements in these countries might not be socialist: there is no chance of the oppressed peoples living in the Eastern bloc being won to socialism if they identify it with Russian oppression and totalitarianism. Of course within these countries the task of socialists is to win the often powerful workers' movements away from nationalist leaderships; but our support for their national rights should not depend upon the influence of genuine democratic socialism.

In the near future this is likely to be a major issue for socialists. Both in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, nationalism looks set to tear the empire of Stalin's successors apart. Socialists must be sure to be on the right side in those battles to come.

----- pull-quotes -----

nation tensio increase

← Contents of Socialist Organiser nos. 369–370: Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europe?

Something wrong on this page? Tell us →