Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The USSR's economic crisis

Socialist Organiser nos. 369–370: Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europe?, 1 September 1988 · scan pp. 8–9 · Martin Thomas · about 1,903 words

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The USSR is by far the world's biggest producer of steel and oil. Its energy consumption per head -another index of industrialisation -is higher than Britain's or West Germany's. •It is able to rival the US in space technology. Even in services and consumer industries it can show some impressive figures. The USSR has more doctors than any other country in the world — one doctor for every 270 people, as against one for every 650 in Britain. It produces more shoes than the US, Britain, France and West Germany put together — enough for every person in the USSR to have 2½ new pairs each year. So why is Mikhail Gorbachev talking so urgently about "years of stagnation" and the need for "reconstruction" (perestroika)?

The impressive figures for gross output translate into much less impressive figures for usable final products. Despite all that steel and oil, fewer Soviet workers than Western workers have cars, and their cars perform worse.

The USSR's economy is even worse at turning the basic industrial materials into more sophisticated goods, like modern machine tools and computers. Productivity is very low. On average, it takes two Soviet workers to produce what one US worker produces in industry, and four in agriculture.

Work in the average Soviet factory goes in cycles. Most of the time, everyone dawdles. Work is held up The limits of Glasnos To have access even to a limited range of views in the media is better than being bómbarded by a mind-numbing uniform "party line'; to be able to vote even between two officially-vetted candidates for works manager is better than having no vote at all.

To this extent Gorbachev's political reforms are a step forward.

They include: "Limiting the term of office for all of. ficials to ten years, unless they get a 75% mandate for a further five years. *Secret ballots for all positions in the state and in the ruling party. The ruling party will, however, keep its monopoly over candidates.

"Better legal procedures for people to br ing complaints against officials. (At present the main method for doing this - a widely-used though ineffective one - is anonymous letters to higher authorities).

The media have become much less rigid, and there is much more liberty for writers and film-makers.

All this stops far short of letting workers organise themselves freely in independent trade unions or new political parties. All moves for workers' self-organisation and self-liberation - and in the USSR, as everywhere, the liberation Reform or Revolution in Eastern Europ because supplies haven't arrived, because machinery has broken down.

Then comes the end of the month. The manager panics because the factory hasn't met its plan target. The target is reached by "storming" - working frantically, striving to turn out the goods any old how, without checking, with parts missing.

So a good proportion of those millions of shoes are useless rubbish. And the bureaucratic chaos spreads through society. Despite all those doctors, you have to pay bribes to get decent medical treatment. In the 1930s, a sort of "storming" produced results. Millions of workers were hurled into digging coal, building power stations, and producing steel. It was chaotic, wasteful, terrible in its consequences for the workers, but it built an industrial base.

Even today, forced-march methods can produce results in the military and space sectors. A bureaucratic command goes out that these sectors are to have first call on scarce supplies and skilled person power. But as a general regime for a modern economy, which needs to be flexible in response to changing disastrous.

A market economy does, in its own way, have flexibility. Competition promotes new technology and new products. There is a huge price to pay for of the workers must be the task of the workers themselves - will be moves against the resistance of Gorbachev and the bureaucracy. The rights of nationalities are central to democracy in the USSR, a multinational empire where the oppressed nationalities, Ukranianians, Armenians, Latvians, Estonians, and others, between them are the majority of the population.

The issue is already explosive. The Kremlin admits that it lost control in Nagorny Karabakh, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan which wants to be united with Armenia. Armenians have staged a general strike on the Karabakh issue, with support from the local Armenian bureaucracy. There are mass protests in Latvia against Russification.

Yet Gorbachev's faction in the bureaucracy is very much a Great Russian faction. Gorbachev has sacked local chiefs in several minority-nationalist areas - accusing them, probably rightly, of corruption - and replaced them by men more in tune with Moscow.

For the workers, Gorbachev's reforms are far from being a revolution. What's important about them is that they may shake up and destabilise the system enough for a real revolution to be made by the workers. the workers - inequality, insecurity, constant pressure - but the system does have its own dynamic.

An economy democratically planned by the workers would be flexible, too -indeed, more flexible, and at a smaller human cost. The USSR's economy, guided by the crude, blundering, lurching efforts of the ruling bureaucrats to develop their national economy in a competitive world, has no such flexibility.

The bureaucrats stumble, flounder and lash out in the dark. Every one of them browbeats their inferiors in the hierarchy and lies to their superiors. There is neither the harsh, anarchic discipline of the market, nor the discipline of conscious human control.

And worse. Not only is the Soviet economy burzaucratic; the bureaucrats are often incompetent bureaucrats. A large proportion of them are elderly men, with little education, who got their jobs by toadying.

The bureaucratic chaos and inertia feeds on itself, as one stop-gap measure after another is used to drag the lumbering monster of the economy forward. The ordinary factories cannot produce fridges that work; so the Defence Ministry starts producing fridges.

Housing is scarce; so each factory corners its own chunk of housing, which it controls and allocates to its workers. The factory may even run its own farms and vegetable gardens, to supply its workers with food.

Each factory and each ministry tries to secure its sources of supply by producing the supplies it needs itsell, so there is wasteful duplication.

As Gorbachev himself says: "Try to get your flat repaired; you will have to find a moonlighter to do it for you, and he will have to steal the materials from a building site" • About 50% of shoe repairs, 40% of car repairs, and 30% of household appliance repairs, are done by private operators. The black market is huge.

Gorbachev does not - and, as flesh and blood of the bureaucracy, cannot -propose workers' control as the answer. Instead, he wants to bring more market mechanisms into the official Soviet economy.

Gorbachev wants to shake up the managers and shake up the economy.

He is moving in five main directions.

*A drive for discipline, against corruption and alcoholism.

*Giving the rules of profit and loss, supply and demand, more scope in the *Exposing corrupt, stick-in-the-mud economy.

bureaucrats to the threat of public exposure and losing their jobs.

*Stacking top jobs with his own sấpporters.

*Withdrawing from Afghanistan, and negotiating arms cuts with the US, so as to lessen the terrible drain on the USSR

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Soviet food queue of military spending.

On paper, Gorbachev has gone a long way towards turning the USSR into a market economy.

Since January 1968, 60% of industrial enterprises have been "self-financing" Instead of paying over their profits to central government, then asking central government for a grant when they want o invest, they are supposed to keep their rofits and decide for themselves whai to do with them — when and how to invest.

Since January 1987, individual ministries and some large individual enterprises have been able to do business directly with the West, cutting through the Foreign Trade Ministry's previous monopoly of such business.

Since May 1987 a new law has greatly increased the scope for co-operative enterprises. Private enterprise is also being given more room. The USSR's first private hospital opened in May 1987. Why the USSR stagnates The progressive role of the Soviet bureaucracy coincides with the period devoted to introducing into the Soviet Union the most important elements of capitalist technique.

The rough work of borrowing, im. itating, transplanting and grafting, was #complished on the bases laid down by the revolution. There was, thus far, no question of any new word in the sphere of technique, science or art.

It is possible to build gigantic factories according to a ready-made Western pat. tern by bureaucratic command -although, to be sure, at tripte the normal In March 1987 the USSR had its first bankruptcy ever. Pro-Gorbachev economists talk about taking all industries except the most basic, largescale ones out of the central plan; having banks operate commercially, lending money at interest to 'industrial enterraking our some 15 midi workers from inefficient enterprises; and raising the prices of basic goods to gear the price system to supply and demand.

In March 1988 new rules were proposed for agriculture. Groups of workers, or individual workers, can strike commercial contracts with a collective farm to do particular jobs. Land and equipment can be leased out for up to 50 years. (A similar measure in China has virtually finished off collective farms and restored private peasant agriculture).

Limits on present private cost. But the farther you go, the more the economy runs into the problem of quality, which slips out of the hands of bureaucracy like a shadow.

The Soviet products are as though branded with the grey label of indifference. Under a nationalised economy, -quality demands a democracy of producers and consumers, freedom of criticism and initiative - conditions incompatible with a totalitarian regime of fear, lies and flattery.

Leon Trotsky.

Revolution Betrayed' Refe which occupy about 3% of the arable land, but produce about 30% of Soviet food - have been lifted. Collective farms are allowed to do business directly with the West.

But the results of all this so far have been meagre. Not only have growth rates been unimpressive. It is doubtful how far the market has become any sort of real counterweight to bureaucratic command and bureaucratic inertia.

Economic measures similar to Gorbachev's have been tried before many times in the Eastern bloc. In agriculture they have sometimes worked. In industry they have been unsuccessful. They have been tried in Hungary and Yugoslavia for 20 or 30 years. They were tried in the USSR in the 1960s. Again and again they have been thwarted by bureaucratic inertia.

The enterprises which are supposed to be "self-financing", for example, say that 80% of their profits still go to their central ministries. The officials in the ministries, however much they agree with generalities about the need for change, do not want to let that money out of their hands.

Bureaucratic influence and stringpulling are still much more powerful than profit-and-loss calculations.

Maybe Gorbachev is determined enough to push further. But he hasn't done yet. In practice, what Gorbachev's economics means so far is increased pressure on workers to produce more, increased wage differentials, and increased insecurity.

Market economics is no more a cureall in the East than it is in the West. Revolution in Eastern Europe Page 7

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technology and people's demands for goods and services, "storming" is

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