Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The USSR: went wr

Socialist Organiser no. 338, 3 December 1987 · scan pp. 4–5 · about 1,198 words

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fighters and insurgents, live and develop without intellectual conflicts, without groupings and temporary factional formations? The farsightnedness of the Bolshevik leadership often made it possible to soften conflicts and shorten the duration of factional struggle, but no more than that. The Central Committee relied upon this seething democratic support. From this it derived the audacity to make decisions and give orders. The obvious correctness of the leadership at all critical stages gave it that high authority which is the priceless moral capital of centralism.

The regime of the Bolshevik party, especially before it came to power, stood thus in complete contradiction to the regime of the present sections of the Communist International, with their "leaders" appointed from above, making complete chnages of policy at a word of command, with their uncontrolled apparatus, naughty in its attitude to the rank and file, servile in its attitude to the Kremlin.

But in the first years after the conquest of power also, even when the administrative rust was already visisle on the party, every Bolshevik, not excluding stalin, would have denounced as a malicious slanderer anyone who should have shown him on a screen the image of the party ten or fifteen years later.

The very centre of Lenin's attenion and that of his colleagues was occupied by a continual concern with protecting the Bolshevik ranks from he vices of those in power. However, he extraordinary closeness and at imes actual merging of the party with the state apparatus had already n those first years done indubitable tarm to the freedom and elasticity of he party regime.

Democracy had been narrowed in roportion as difficulties increased. n the beginning, the party had wishd and hoped to preserve freedom of volitical struggle within the ramework of the Soviets. The civil var introduced stern amendments ino this calculation. The Opposition arties were forbidden one after the ther. This measure, obviously in onflict with the spirit of Soviet emocracy, the leaders of Bolshevism convenience in administration. Already in 1922, during a brief improvement in his health, Lenin, horrified at the threatening growth of bureaucratism, was preparing struggle against the faction of Stalin, which had made itself the axis of the party machine as a first step towards capturing the machinery of state. A second stroke and then death prevented him from measuring forces with this internal reaction.

The entire effort of Stalin, with whom at that time Zinoviev and Kamenev were working hand in hand, was thenceforth directed to freeing the party machine from the control of the rank-and-file members of the party. In this struggle for "stability" of the Central Committee, Stalin proved the most consistent and reliable among his colleagues. He had no need to tear himself away from international problems; he had never been concerned with them. The petty-bourgeois outlook of the new ruling stratum was his own outlook. He profoundly believed that the task of creating socialism was national and administrative in its nature. He looked upon the Communist International as a necessary evil which should be used so far as possible for the purposes of foreign policy. His own party kept a value in his eyes merely as a submissive support for the machine.

Theory

Together with the theory of socialism in one country, there was put into circulation by the bureaucracy a theory that in Bolshevism the Central Committee is everything and the party nothing. This second theory was in any case realized with more success than the Availing itself of the death of Lenin, the ruling group announced a "Leninist levy" . The gates of the party, always carefully guarded, were now thrown wide open. Workers, clerks, petty officials, flocked through in crowds. The political aim of this manoeuvre was to dissolve the revolutionary vanguard in raw human material, without experience, without independence, and yet with the old habit of submitting to the authorities.

The scheme was successful. By freeing the bureaucracy from the control of the proletarian vanguard, the "Leninist. levy" dealt a deathblow to the party of Lenin. The machine had won the necessary independence. Democratic centralism gave place to bureaucratic centralism. In the party apparatus itself there now took place a radical reshuffling of personnel from top to bottom. The chief merit of a Bolshevik was declared to be obedience. Under the guise of a struggle with the Opposition, there occurred a sweeping replacement of revolutionists with chinovniks (professional governmental functionaries). The history of the Bolshevik party became a history of its rapid degeneration.

The many by the circumstance that the leaders of all three groupings, Left, Centre and Right, belonged to one and the same staff in the Kremlin, the Politburo. To superficial minds it seemed to be a mere matter of personal rivalry, a struggle for the "heritage" of Lenin. But in the conditions of iron dictatorship social antagonisms could not show themselves at first except through the institutions of the ruling party.

Many Thermidorians emerged in their day from the circle of Jacobins. Bonaparte himself belonged to that circle in his early years, and subsequently it was from among former Jacobins that the First Consul and Emperor of France selected his most faithful servants. Times change and the Jacobins with them, not excluding the Jacobins of the twentieth century.

Of the Politburo of Lenin's epoch there now remains only Stalin. Two of its members, Zinoviev and Kamenev, collaborators of Lenin throughout many years as emigres, are enduring ten-year prison terms for a crime which they did not commit. Three other members, Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky, are completely removed from the leadership, but as a reward for submission occupy secondary posts. And, finally, the author of these lines is in exile. The widow of Lenin, Krupskaya, is also under the ban, having proved unable with all her efforts to adjust herself completely to the Thermidor, The members of the present Politburo occupied secondary posts throughout the history of the Bolshevik party. If anybody in the first years of the revolution had predicted their future elevation, they would have been the first in surprise, and there would have been no false modesty in their surprise. For this very reason, the rule is more stern at present that the Politburo is always right, and in any case that no man can be right against the Politburo. But, moreover, the Politburo cannot be right against Stalin, who is unable to make mistakes and consequently cannot be right against himself.

Democracy

Demands for party democracy were through all this time the slogans of all the oppositional groups, as insistent as they were hopeless. The platform of the Left Opposition demanded in 1927 that a special law be written into the Criminal Code "punishing as a serious state crime every direct or indirect persecution of a worker for criticism." Instead of this, there was introduced into the Criminal Code an article against the Left Opposition itself.

Of party democracy there remained only recollections in the memory of the older generation. And together

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During this 70th anniversary year of the Russian workers' revolution of 1917, Socialist Organiser has attempted to analyse, in the paper and in our special pamphlet, the significance of the Rus-

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