Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

[The 1972 docks strike. Three of the stewards…]

Socialist Organiser no. 331, 22 October 1987 · scan pp. 6–7 · about 2,721 words

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The 1972 docks strike. Three of the stewards threatened with jail stand ul res the Wi bur Mil chil the mo stal bee wa: me situ anc this Wc job por ten OVE dus yea em in the altl sha tiol bra ren All tior ten tor wh an me Ru Par It i duc fasi cla: mo wal duc the ma stre tin vol act WO them. tem gair redi tod tem with ith the outbreak of World War trade union leaders were cored to the corridors or power y had vacated in the '20s th the trade unions' archreaucrat, Ernest Bevin, at the nistry of Labour for the ChurIl/Attlee Coalition government, trade union leaders were even re thoroughly integrated into the te in World War 2 than they had in between 1914 and 1918 Anti-strike legislation (Order 1305) s introduced. Employers diately took advantage of the lation to victimise shop stewards, 1 there were numerous strikes over s issue. In 1941 the Essential orks Order gave some protection to is. Offensive strikes began. The great majority of workers suprted the war, but there was discont with the way it was being run. sucher quotes one observer: *Clydeside workers are also having war of their own.. they cannot ercome the bitter memory of instrial insecurity in the past ten urs, and their distrust of the stives of managers and ployers".

The average number of strike days 1939-45 was well above the level of depression years of the '30s nough most strikes were short, irp and successful.

The Aircraft Shop Stewards' Nanal Council now attempted to emice all engineering workers, and amed itself the Engineering and ied Trades Shop Stewards' Nanal Council. ts April 1940 conference was atded by 283 stewards from 140 facies, and the sales of its newspaper landed. The Communist Party, ich initially opposed the war, was important influence on this movent.

After the German invasion of ssia in June 1941 the Communist rty switched to supporting the war. opposed strikes and backed pro¿tivity drives.

Anti-fascist

This together with the general anticist sentiment which the ruling ss exploited, ensured that no vement similar to that of the first r emerged. n some situations the Joint proction Committees set up to draw stewards into collaboration with nagement served to legitimise and engthen the stewards' organisan hawever The ctewards were inved more than ever before in the ual organisation and control of rk. 4 major breakthrough compared in ine Irst war was unal most wards' committees were joint comitees on which the skilled sat with unskilled. Committees had their n libraries and published their own nual reports, although facilities on whole remained poor Shop meetings and report-backs re regular and central to maintainroots in the membership. Most wards, given the personal and ial as well as industrial nature of ir members' problems during warle, developed a close rapport with ory bulletins and newspapers a tremendous flowering in this od. Combine committees providorganisation outside the plant in ns such as A V Roe, Daimler, nlop, and Bickers Armstrong. Is the war ended, employers atpted to take back many of these ns. In many factories there were undancies. Another parallel with ay: some stewards committees atpted to respond to redundancies 1 plans for alternative production. he movement of 1918 had not been recaptured, still less the aspirations of the Minority Movement. The war had ensured that shop stewards representing their members would be once more an essential feature of industrial relations. But the influence of the CP made it probable that it would be on the basis of sectional organisation limited to industrial struggles and with powerful tendencies towards collaboration with the employers and government in the 'national interest The long boom was now to that probability into reality.

In the twenty years after the war, the number and organisation of shop stewards expanded continuously.

In 1947 the AEU recorded 19,000 stewards. By 1962 it was about 32,000. In 1961 the total number of stewards in the UK was estimated at 90,000. Research for the Donovan Commission seven years later put the figure at 175,000.

That research also recorded a spread of the shop steward from engineering into the distributive and service occupations. 45% of stewards were still in the metal industries, but 36% were outside manufacturing, including 12% in transport and communication.

The shop steward in the early '60s was a representative identifying closely with his or her work group and bargaining directly on their behalt.

The steward bargained over a whole range of problems affecting the control of work - its organisation, the degree of effort, the level of overtime. S/he was particularly powerful where bargaining was over money, as for example with piecework systems.

In those circumstances, s/he was able to develop a whole range of custom-and-practice controls, which acted for the benefit of the work group and could be exploited on its behalf in the high-demand market conditions of the long boom.

Full employment swung the bargaining power to the shop floor. In short, sharp, unofficial strikes, small groups could jack up their earnings.

In what was called "wage drift', increases at the local level outstripped the national agreements which continued in the post-war period.

utonomy both from the union and rom higher management. As naonal agreements were increasingly relevant, so was the outside strucare of the union.

Joint committees of stewards with rong support from the membership ere able to establish their own unds, produce their own publicity, nd link up across plants.

*Our evidence is that more than wo-thirds of shop stewards have at heir place of work a committee in /hich they meet with management to iscuss and settle problems, and that wo-thirds of these committees are nulti-union. Where that is so, the ommittees are not easily made esponsible to a trade union authority utside the factory." (Donovan port).

*In effect the shop steward rganisation at Ford was thus involvthe trade unions with ti ed in an attempt to establish standards for the rest of labour informally on a 'custom and practice' basis and in the face of disapproval of top management - even if it met with frequent concessions from lower level supervision" (Turner, Clack and Roberts, 'Labour Relations in the Motor Industry').

'In short, it appears to me in the light of the undisputed facts disclosed in this inquiry hat there is a private union within a union enjoying immediate and continuous touch with the men in the shop, answerable to no superiors and in no way officially or constitutionally linked with the union hierarchy" (Report of Court of Inquiry into dispute at Briggs Motor Bodies Ltd., 1957).

Hostile

Union officialdom, employers, and the state were alike hostile to strong independent workplace organisation. Lord Carron, president of the AEU, said of shop stewards in 1960:

*These men are werewolves who are rushing madly towards industrial ruin and howling delightedly at the foam on their muzzles which they accept as their only guiding light."

A 1960 TUC report on shop stewards showed the same attitude less graphically. "Unions should be more vigilant, and if after a warning a steward repeats actions contrary to rules and agreements, his credentials (which are his opportunities to do good or in a few cases to do harm) should be withdrawn."

In the same year, a TUC general council member denounced combine committees as a challenge to established union arrangements' attempting to 'usurp the policy-making functions of unions"

Sometimes - as at Ford in 1962— management were able to push through a hard line and weaken shop floor organisation, demonstrating the inadennaciec of certionalicm More often they successfully accommodated the stewards' challenge.

By the mid-'60s, however, with the UK's economic Situation getting worse, "alsoraer, in inaustrial relations was increasingly seen as a key obstacle to the preferred solution -wage cutting through incomes policy.

Attention focused on the steward, notably in the Donovan report.

Donovan pointed out that: "for the most part the steward is viewed by others and views himself as an accepted, reasonable, and even moderating influence, more of a lubricant than an irritant"

Their strategy was to strengthen this side of the steward's, role. Employers and unions should work together, the report argued, "to recognise, define and control the part played by shop stewards in our collective bargaining system."

Shop floor organisation was inevitable - and it could be helpful. The point was to control and influence it.

The steward could be civilised and drawn away from his or her members by the creation of written agreements, to codify and pin down "custom and practice, which the stewards would then have to enforce. ine repiacement or piecework by UNE measured time systems, work study, and job evaluation, could undermine the power of the section steward and formalise and rationalise the link between work and payment.

Legitimise

Written procedures would legitimise management's decisions because they had been taken after discussion and negotation. They would draw the steward into more "rational' argument, and also pull bargaining up from the machine room to the committee room.

Formalised bargaining at plant or company level would lead to a centralisation of power at committee level and a loss of power at section level. The development of full-time stewards; the managment-run closed shop with deduction of dues at source; the extension of facilities for stewards; time off for training in industrial relations - these would encourage more 'rational' behaviour. and distance the stewards from their memberhsip.

By the end of the 60s trade union leaders, too, had replaced their earner nostilly to workplace organisation by an attempt to incore porate it.

Jack Jones, on becoming TGWU general secretary declared support for a system where not a few trade union officials control the situation but a dedicated, well-trained and intelligent body of trade union members is represented by hundreds The bosses had dew of thousands of lay representatives"

The election of Hugh Seanlon as president of the AUEW further symbolised a takeover by a generation who believed in the shop steward system, from those nurtured in prewar defeats.

Even the GWU leadership came ro terms with decentralisation -shocked by its loss of members to the

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ards' Movement RAL GROU OF DOCKS EDGIFAROS RISE YE WORKERS istory der a union banner.

TGWU in Ford, and by the revolt of its members against the union in the 1970 Pilkington strike, when strikers tried to set up a breakaway union.

National and regional industrial conferences to involve workplace representatives were introduced in 1969, and a majority of lay representation on the Executive provided for ments from 1964 to 1979, and the large-scale increases in union membership — all led to a further increase in the number of stewards, to their progress into new areas, and to changes in their organisation.

In 1973 the Commission on Industrial Relations claimed that *there were well in excess of 250,000 and perhaps approaching 300,000 shop stewards in 1971. troduced on the docks, on ships in schools.

Workplace representatives in textiles and shops began to call themselves stewards in 1977. NALGO introduced a shop steward system.

An increasing hierarchy and professionalism of stewards went along with this growth.

Brown, Ebsworth and Terry estimated that in 1976 there were even of the company.

Full-time stewards often hold no sectional responsibilities, and no longer share to the same degree the insecurities and work experience of their members.

Involvement in higher union bodies and participation schemes meant that life became one long round of meetings and courses, with perks attached. This was likely to estrange them from, and weaken, workplace organisation, Some observers saw the success of Labour's Social Contract (1974-5) in its ability to secure growing control of the official unions over workplace organisation. While union leaders were involved in the Social Contract at the top, workplace leaders were incorporated at the bottom.

It was not as simple as that.

The strategies of the state and the employers did have a tremendous degree of success. By 1980 much of the structure of workplace trade unionism was management-moulded, management-sponsored.

The bosses had developed the understanding that the workplace organisation, just like the wider union, could be used against rather than for the worker — could be used by capital for its own purposes.

Donovan's insight into the ambivalence of the steward's role, and the strategy of the 1974 Labour government derived from it, yielded tremendous dividends to capital. I his is central. But it has to be seen against the political background Strong roots in the membership had allowed the stewards to organise a wave of struggles in the early 1970s. But, paradoxically, the favourable economic situtation was both an aid and a hindrance.

Muscle

Un the one hand it gave the workplace leaders the muscle to go forward. On the other hand the ability to do so and to go round the union leaders (or force them reluctantly to trail behind) reinforced the limitations of the workplace leaders political tradition, to ensure that no adequate alternative political leadership was thrown up. They never felt the need for it, and unlike the 1920s there was no strong revolutionary party able to win the key layer of stewards to consistent revolutionary polities.

As issues arose the activists turned not to trying to control the Labour Party, or to supporting a new party, but to industrial means, to direct action, alone. Despite the efforts of revolutionary groups, no viable, even embryonic, rank and file organisation, not even a small-scale pallid reflection of the Minority Movement, was established.

It was the ability of the state and the employers to use these crucial political weaknesses against the rank and file leaders which was in the to undermine their basic strength.

By the late 1970s, it had become clear that militancy within normal bounds, plus Labour voting according to tradition, could produce no more than Wilson attacking the unions instead of Heath. As it became clear that the economic situation in the late '70s really was worse than that of the early '70s, then all the movement's limitations came to the surface.

The delusion that "industrial militancy is enough' was dispelled. Vast layers of the militant labour movement had always been vulnerable to appeals to support 'the national interest' , etc., and this now took its toll.

The 1972 upsurge halted when the dockers were released. The 1974 upsurge was halted by Wilson.

What was missing was a leadership which would have been able to take the movement forward, to bring down Heath in the first case, to hammer Wilson and establish a workers' government in the second.

No answers Shop floor leaders had no answers to the arguments of Murray and Wilson that wages cause inflation, that this was the reason why the economy was in trouble, that an incomes policy could help, and so on.

Leastwise, their arguments were not strong e enough to carry their members with them and stop the official leadership going with Wilson.

The election of the Thatcher government opened up the use of mass unemployment to undermine shopfleor strength. Building on the work of Wilson and Callaghan, the bosses have victimised steward after steward, pushed back or intimidated workplace after We have to provide the answers. We have to provide them urgently.

We must base ourselves on, and learn the lessons from, the hopeful signs amid the general retreat; on the minority of workers across industry who are prepared to fight.

We have shop stewards in more workplaces than ever before. We have got to get them moving again -this time on a clear-cut basis of independent and socialist policies.

We have to build a movement that can do everything that the movement to free the Pentonville Five did and more. We have to answer the central questions of viability, unemployment and urorun democracy.

We have to do this with our feet firmly planted in the workplaces, and our heads working for a rethink and transformation in the wider labour movement. We have to make sure that this time, a militant upturn means more than just more militancy.

PLUTO HANDBOOKS

----- pull-quotes -----

Autonomy Shop stewards gained some

militant shop stewards' of the '60s and '70s.

A THE 1K AUl THE nack

understanding that organisation, just lil could be used agail the worker...

eloped the CORNT FEL

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