The Palestine Liberation Organisation re-unites
Socialist Organiser1987 1987-04-30Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 2 →
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ACORED Briet IRA campaign THE BRITISH government is discussing whether or not to put the British Army back centre-stage in Northern Ireland, in face of a renewed IRA offensive which has seen a wave of attacks on members of the RUC Last week a prominent judge and his wife were blown up.
There are a number of reasons for the IRA's increased activity. The Sinn Fein/IRA leaders must convince their own hard-core militants that Sinn Fein's lurn to polities does not mean any military softening-up.
Last November's old guard split-off from the Provisional Republican Movement now exists in unequal competition with Sinn Fein, in the guise of Republican Sinn Fein, led by Provo founders David O'Connell and Rory O'Brady.
SF did miserably in the recent 26 Counties election, getting only a little above 1% of the vote, so the focus on politics may be coming under hostile pressure within the Republican movement.
"External' concerns, too, govern the Provos' tactics. They know that the best hope they have of seeing the Anglo-Irish agreement smashed is for a massive Protestant backlash to develop. The killing of off-duty RUC men, and incidents like last week's killing of a Protestant worker because his brother's firm had done some maintenance work for the RUC, are designed to stoke up anger in the Protes(ant community.
The Protestant militants opposed to the Anglo-Irish agreement have spent the last 18 months putting pressure on the RUC. The new and more lethal pressure from the IRA may decide the British government to try to take some of the pressure off the RUC by returning the Army to a more central role.
A complication is that any move Britain makes has now to be squared with its Dublin partners in the Anglo-Irish agreement. Though the new Taoiseach, Charles J Haughey, quickly declared after the election that he would work the agreement, he may make difficulties.
On the whole, though, things have been going very well for the Anglo-Irish agreement. Three weeks ago a historic meeting occurred — the first gathering of a committee of representatives from the British and irish parliaments agreed under the terms of the Anglo-Irish agreement.
In the event of a devolved Parliament being set up in Belfast, the interparliamentary committee will also include representatives of that body. Closer links now exist between Britain and Ireland than at any time since Dail Eireann seceded from Westminster in January 1919, The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) has reunited under the well-known leadership of Yasser Arafat, following the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers last week. But improved relations with other factions have been won at the cost to Arafat of a move towards more hard-line nationalist positions.
The Council broke with Arafat's recent orientation towards the moderate' Arab regimes. A representative of the Polisario guerrilla group attended the meeting at the PLO's invitation, prompting tions with the PLO. The PNC abrogated the PLO-Jordanian 'Amman agreement' signed in 1985, in which Arafat and King Hussein agreed to coordinate peace initiatives (although in practice Hussein has been ditching the PLO).
And most important of all, the PNC condemned the Peace Treaty with Israel signed by Egypt in 1979, and theoretically at least, banned contact with the Egyptian government. Even more galling for Egypt's President Mubarak, the PNC resolved that it would continue to deal with "popular and democratic" — i.e. opposition - forces in Egypt.
The Egyptian government promptly closed all PLO offices in the country.
This realignment marks quite a serious shift. Arafat's orientation towards Egypt - which although for long a pariah in the Arab world and still not fully reintegrated, is the strongest Arab state - followed the PLO's terrible defeat in Lebanon in 1982. The PLO was forced to evacuate Beirut, and Arafat quickly tried to make new diplomatic friends.
After that, the PLO came close to falling apart. Long-standing differences between the 'moderates' seeking a degree of compromise with Israel, and the hard-liners, exploded into a major military conflict in 1983 which split Arafat's own organisation, Fatah.
Bridges have since been mended, and now Arafat has managed to reunite not only with his own dissidents, but with hard-line adversaries of his for many years, like the PFLP's George Habash.
Habash, who boycotted the last PNC because of the rapprochement with Jordan and is a bitter opponent of the current Egyptian regime, has emerged as a key figure in the reorganised PLO.
Whether or not Arafat can be held to the more hard-line stance remains to be seen. For the new arrangement is a double-edged sword in some respects for the hard-liners. The reunification of the PLO under Arafat's leadership is widely perceived as a defeat for the main hardliner, Syria, which has been trying to force Arafat out of Arab affairs. Arafat has emerged much strengthened after the PNC and many commentators consider that he has in reality only made minor concessions.
Autonomy
To an extent, therefore, the overall result is greater autonomy of the PLO leadership from Arab governments. But the PLO is today very weak, and this autonomy is unlikely to last. Hopefully, a more united PLO will be able to restrict the ability of different Arab governments to manipulate its divisions, but that too remains to be seen.
Is this a victory for the left? It is good that the PLO shows solidarity with Polisario, and rejects an alliance with King Hussein, who in 1970 butchered Palestinians living in Jordan, and has as much Palestinian blood on his hands as Israel does. Egypt, too, is a right-wing regime.
But the hardline nationalists have no coherent alternative to Arafat's increasingly unsuccessful diplomatic endeavours. Their concentration on the Israel-Egypt peace treaty is a case in point. There is no doubt that the Egyptian government's decision to sign a peace treaty was very popular in Egypt at the time, although now it is a focus for much discontent with Mubarak's regime. Straightforward rejection of any peace treaty on principle is a purely nationalist response that cannot relate to the real concerns of the Egyptian masses, who have suffered heavily in wars with Israel.
Moreover, it cannot relate to the Israeli Jewish masses. Since 1974, and more so since, the Arafat leadership has made empirical tactical adaptations in its 'democratic secular state' policy that might allow for more flexibility in relating to the Jews. But it has coupled this with a diplomatic strategy that has relied, more and more, on right wing regimes that never deliver the goods.
The ultra-nationalist alternative mainly substitutes only a more vigorous 'armed struggle' and reliance on supposedly more radical regimes like Syria. This strategy also fails to relate to the Arabs in the occupied territories, many of whom are workers, and some of whom work inside the 'Green line'. , in Israel.
The PLO has proven that it can survive. Thus the central objective of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and subsequent foreign policy, has failed. And this survival alone is important for the Palestinian people. But the PLO cannot break the logjam, A socialist movement that breaks out of the purely nationalist framework of the past is needed - a working class movement that recognises Israeli national rights and tries to win Israeli workers to wholehearted support for the Palestinian cause.
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